Oxford Pastoralist Research Day

Pastoralism and Resilience

Current Debates and Approaches to Development in Pastoralist Regions

May 31^st, 2013

 12-5pm

Seminar Room, African Studies Centre

13 Bevington Road, Oxford

The recent drought in the Sahel and Horn of Africa has once again drawn attention to the issue of how pastoralist livelihood systems are responding to complex changes in the ecological, political and economic environment. At the same time donors and aid agencies are increasingly advocating for a ‘resiliency and risk reduction’ approach to pastoralist development initiatives.

The aim of the Oxford Pastoralist Research day is to bring together locally based researchers, practitioners and others interested in these communities to share ideas and experiences on what is meant by resilience and to interrogate the various assumptions and theories of change that is informing current policy towards pastoralists and the multiple challenges they are facing.

Confirmed discussants so far will cover the following issues:

Ÿ  Adaptations to drought in the Sahel

Ÿ  NGO practices in Somali region Ethiopia

Ÿ  Land rights and commercialization in the Horn

Ÿ  Herding and learning, models for appropriate education in Ethiopia.

Ÿ  Marketing

Ÿ  Emerging issues-Central Asia.

Students and practitioners are invited to join these discussions and share any aspect of their current research or ongoing project activity. The meeting is open to anyone interested in this topic.

Please register your interest or subject that you would like to present on and send this information to: kitdorey@yahoo.co.uk, angela.raven-roberts@lmh.ox.ac.uk or jason.mosley@africa.ox.ac.uk by May 5th 2013. We will inform you of the final agenda and look forward to seeing you at the meeting.

‘Post-transitional’ directions in the Somalias

April 30, 2013

12:00 pm

Nissan Lecture Theatre

St Antony’s College

University of Oxford

As Somalia’s Transitional Federal Charter was being wound down in August 2012, and particularly after the new Federal Parliament elected Hassan Sheikh Mohamud as president in September, a surge of sentiment — loosely organised around the keyword/hashtag ‘Somalia Rising’ — was channelled into discussions on Twitter and other social media and discussion fora.  By and large, commentators focused on the positive implications of the change of leadership taking place in Mogadishu.

After the establishment of a notionally permanent government in Mogadishu, that optimism is set to be tested.  However, long-standing assumptions about Somalia may also need to be questioned, in order to gain a better sense of what has changed, what has not, and what new challenges are ahead.  Related to the question of where Somalia is headed is the question of the state of ‘Somali studies’ after two decades of reduced access for external scholars and an impaired educational environment in Somalia itself.

This workshop will consider a range of political and social dynamics, grouped around two themes — ‘Futures in the Somalias’ and ‘The Future of Somali Studies’.  In addition, we will take advantage of the occasion to launch a special issue of the Journal of Eastern African Studies, guest edited by Markus Hoehne, Effects of ‘Statelessness’: Dynamics of Somali politics, economy and society since 1991.

The workshop is open to all, and will involve a mix of academic and practitioner voices.  Please register interest (or questions) by emailing Jason Mosley, the convenor of the Horn of Africa seminar, at jason.mosley@africa.ox.ac.uk.

Directions to St Antony’s College:

http://www.sant.ox.ac.uk/about/directions.html

Programme

H.E. Mr. Giorgio Napolitano,

President of the Republic of Italy,

H.E. Mr. Mario Monti,

Prime Minister of the Republic of Italy

Your Excellencies,

The 18^th International Conference of Ethiopian Studies was held in the eastern Ethiopian city of Dire Dawa from 29 October to 2 November 2012. The conference brought together three hundred scholars from twenty-six countries from all over the world. It was the latest in the series of conferences first held in Italy in 1959.

On the last day of the conference, we the participants noted with great dismay the erection in August 2012 of a monument to the Fascist war criminal Rodolfo Graziani in the town of Affile. The name of Graziani is associated with the worst atrocities of Italian Fascism in Ethiopia and, earlier, in Libya, resulting in the deaths of tens of thousands of Africans. He is remembered for vowing to deliver Ethiopia to Mussolini “with or without the Ethiopians”. He went on to fulfill that vow with indiscriminate use of chemical weapons and the massacre of thousands of Ethiopians. The notorious “Graziani Massacre” that followed the attempt on his life on 19 February 1937 was marked by brutal and inhuman killing of thousands of innocent Ethiopians. Targeted for liquidation in particular were a number of young educated Ethiopians. This was followed by the massacre in May of nearly three hundred monks and over twenty other Ethiopians in the medieval monastery of Debre Libanos.

Graziani was never tried for his war crimes in Africa. Had he been alive, there is no doubt that he would have been forced to face justice at the International Criminal Court. The erection with public funds of a monument for someone who has the blood of so many Africans on his hands is therefore adding insult to injury.

The participants of the conference have noted the great contribution that Italian scholars have made to Ethiopian studies as well as to the initiation of the series of conferences that have brought them together to discuss their research findings for the last fifty-three years. They are also aware of the good relations that have existed between the peoples and governments of the two countries.

But they fear that the erection of such a monument to a confirmed war criminal jeopardizes those relations. They, therefore, express their solidarity with the Italians and Ethiopians who have already expressed their strong displeasure at this act and demand either the dismantling of this shameful monument or its rededication to the tens of thousands of victims of Graziani. Further, we feel that the Italian Government should pass a law that makes it illegal to celebrate and commemorate people who have committed internationally recognized war crimes.

Respectfully,

The Participants of the 18^th International Conference of Ethiopian Studies

Dire Dawa, Ethiopia

cc. H.E. Ato Girma Wolde Giorgis,

President of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia

H.E. Ato Haile Mariam Dessalegn,

Prime Minister of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia

H.E. Mr. Renzo Rosso,

Italian Ambassador to Ethiopia

Italian Association of African Studies

Screenshot taken from video. Copyright: FOX Inc.

As a child of the 80s and 90s growing up in North America, I was rather accustomed to hearing about Ethiopian conflict and famine on the news. However, one afternoon while my mother was watching The Young and the Restless in the living room, something caught my ear. A character casually suggested that the couple head to an Ethiopian restaurant for dinner. My adolescent mind was blown. How did the writers hear about Ethiopian food?! And who among them had the gumption to actually try it? Oh, and I sure hope they didn’t see the kitfo! Hitherto, I had only known Western and Ethiopian social spaces to exist separately, and the notion that the two could overlap truly fascinated me.

On November 13, 2011 an episode of The Simpsons aired, entitled “The Food Wife“. It featured a 3.5-minute segment where the family wearily stumble upon a Little Ethiopia enclave, but eventually find that they thoroughly enjoy the tastes and textures of Ethiopian cuisine. As foolishly entertaining as the show can be, The Simpsons is both a repository and icon of American pop culture and often provides great analyses on issues of contemporary global importance through satire. There’s much to learn from that two dimension dysfunctional family.

The following lines are taken from the opening scene of the segment, where Marge is horrified when her car breaks down in a dark and seedy part of town.

Bart: “Um, mom. Where are we?“

Marge: “Nowhere scary” [as she hurriedly locks the car doors].

And later on in the segment when the family runs into some other non-Ethiopian characters at the restaurant:

Marge: “So did all of your cars break down?“
Lisa: “Mom! They’re here on purpose. They’re foodies.“

I presume that images of the neighbourhood were inspired by Los Angeles’ Little Ethiopia strip, however the details mirror similar establishments found in other metropolitan cities across North America. Fairfax Avenue/Olympic Boulevard in Los Angeles, the U Street corridor in Washington, D.C., and Danforth/Greenwood in Toronto. These are all small but vibrant enclaves, lined with Ethiopian restaurants, convenience stores and clubs. Marge’s initial concern when she entered the neighbourhood likely represents the fact that ‘Little Ethiopias’ often pop up in previously downtrodden parts of town – much like the enclaves of most new immigrant communities. While this can be a welcomed change to these neighbourhoods initially, a number of social and economic factors usually help to politicize the issue.

Take for example the push back from black-American community activists in D.C. and business associations in Toronto in response to efforts to have these neighbourhoods officially recognized as ‘Little Ethiopia’; in addition to ownership and infrastructural challenges faced by Ethiopian business owners in Los Angeles. These all raise critical questions about how diaspora populations are implicated in complex processes of gentrification as well as national identity politics. Who was there before the Ethiopians came and why did they leave? Who governs the boundaries of the spaces they now occupy? And how are traditional representations of cities and states challenged by the emergence of new and racialized community enclaves? All this from The Simpsons?!

Now of course, there are some shameless throwbacks to traditional stereotypes about Ethiopia sprinkled throughout the episode. Like when Bart exclaims, “I want to live in Ethiopia!” after thoroughly enjoying his first taste of Ethiopian cuisine. Presumably, the humour is to be found in the assumption that people in the West do not aspire to live in the infamously poverty-stricken country, or – if you’re inclined to give The Simpsons a little more credit – it pokes fun at the people who would find the notion of living in Ethiopia humorous to begin with. There’s also the nod to the classic trope of the African tribe, when Marge gasps and shouts, “That newborn has earrings!”

However, The Simpsons is usually equitable in its assaults. There was also some interesting and entertaining commentary on the Western hipster ‘foodie’ culture:

Marge: “What’s the craziest thing on the menu?” Lisa: [Nervously laughs] “She means the most authentic.”

Lisa: “Exotic. Vegetarian. I can mention it in a college essay… Mom this is amazing!“

Foodies: “Wait, what is she eating? They never served me that dish and I wear indigenous beaded headgear.” […] “Gasp – they have prepared her a dish from the non-translated page!” […] “Our passion is to seek out interesting foods, savour their exotic flavours, then blog about them.“

When one of the foodies suggested that they ‘discovered’ Korean BBQ in that town, Lisa (the proverbial voice of reason on the show) sarcastically asked, “Uhhh, before the Koreans?” – to which another replied, “oh sure they cook it, but they don’t get it.” Surf the web at any given point and you’ll find endless references to Ethiopian food as ‘exotic’, self-congratulatory accounts of people ‘adventurous’ enough to try it, and a never-ending race to ‘discover’ the most tucked away and ‘authentic’ restaurants. It will be interesting to examine the processes of exoticization and appropriation as Ethiopian food and culture moves deeper into mainstream Western spaces. Also, how will diaspora communities respond to, challenge and reproduce these narratives for various social, political and economic ends?

As the popular adage goes, everything is political… even injera.

Call for Papers:

Researching Africa: The Flow of Research?

Saturday, 23rd February 2013 –  St Antony’s College, Oxford 

Researching Africa Day provides graduate students with the opportunity to network with fellow researchers, exchange information, discuss research strategies and develop ideas in a constructive, stimulating and engaging environment. The workshop is open to all graduates working on Africa within the disciplines of history, politics, economics, development studies, literature, anthropology, social policy, geography, public health and the natural sciences.

This year’s workshop, Researching Africa: The Flow of Research?, interrogates the process of researching Africa. We hope to explore how research progresses, as well as examine the issues and obstacles that confront researchers at various stages. We aim to question the idea that research always follows a sequence that begins in the library and ends on the word processor. We have divided the workshop into four panels that follow the accepted chronology of research, and we invite papers that either investigate these stages (from the acquisition of material to its presentation), or challenge their relationship to one another, in order to understand the ‘flow’ of research as it actually is.

Call for papers in pdf format.

]]> http://focusonthehorn.wordpress.com/2013/01/10/14th-annual-researching-africa-day-workshop/feed/ 0 emlochery http://focusonthehorn.wordpress.com/2012/11/17/ethiopia-a-country-suspended-in-time/ http://focusonthehorn.wordpress.com/2012/11/17/ethiopia-a-country-suspended-in-time/#comments Sat, 17 Nov 2012 02:05:54 +0000 alphaabebe http://focusonthehorn.wordpress.com/?p=727 Continue reading →]]> By Alpha Abebe

Image Copyright: Alpha Abebe

In development studies, it’s become rather stale to critique Walt Rostow – the grandfather of neoliberal ideology – and his 1960 book The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto. We’ve seemingly moved past the tempting notion that a country’s health can be measured along a linear path of economic growth. And it should go without saying that it is no longer useful or appropriate to talk about societies as “backward and traditional”. And the concept of ‘modernity’ –the idea that certain countries somehow exist outside of time and are waiting to catch up with the rest – is ironically outdated itself. However, one has to wonder whether mainstream representations of Africa have moved far enough away from these stubborn tropes.

I was left wondering this very thing after reading Mary Harper’s recent piece for BBC News Africa: Ethiopia’s ‘cupcake divide’ in Addis Ababa. From the title and content of the article, one gets the impression that the author was dumbfounded to stumble upon traces of 21st century existence in the middle of Africa. Her article is framed as a commentary on the rapid industrialization in Addis Ababa, juxtapositioned against the country’s chronic poverty and political uncertainty. However, this story is buried beneath a rather colourful depiction of Addis Ababa, a city apparently suspended between two centuries and trying to decide which to settle in:

“… Every time I go to Addis Ababa, more tall, sparkling buildings take me by surprise and confuse my bearings.

This time, in amongst the concrete shells of impressive new constructions, I saw an advert for “skyscraper window cleaners”.

Modernity has brought with it some interesting new job opportunities.

Addis Ababa is simultaneously highly globalised and seemingly stuck in a highly traditional, highly Ethiopian way of life and doing politics.

The city is currently in deep mourning for Ethiopia’s longstanding leader, Meles Zenawi, who died in August. This was a man who, despite being one of the West’s great allies in Africa, found it difficult to tolerate opposition – whose human rights record was poor, but whose people do not seem to be able to let him go.

His funeral resembled a medieval pageant, with giant umbrellas, white horses in black cloaks, and tens of thousands of weeping mourners following his coffin through the streets of Addis Ababa, as rain beat down on them from the grey skies above.

But back now to the other world of a modern African city.

My afternoon of cupcakes and beer was followed by an evening of music. The Jazzamba Lounge – which opened a few years ago – is in the old ballroom of what is described as the oldest hotel in Addis Ababa. And it was here that I found another bit of almost post-modern globalisation.

As I sat eating a perfect Italian pizza, I watched a salsa class in full swing. Cuban music soared into the night, as Ethiopian teenagers sashayed around the dance floor, in the red and gold of the grand old ballroom.

Outside the Jazzamba Lounge, there was wild activity.

In one little nightclub a crowd – almost exclusively male – danced to reggae. In another, I was confronted almost immediately with a gyrating bottom, as a prostitute swung her assets to a man seemingly more interested in his beer than her backside.

Outside, there were beggars break-dancing in the dust…”

Modernity, post-modern, stuck, traditional, medieval … these are some of the words used throughout this article that breathe life into a discourse many have fought hard to kill. Even if one were to subscribe to this worldview, it is incredibly misleading to describe the opening of a new jazz lounge as a signifier of ‘a modern African city’, as if to completely gloss over half a century of Ethiopian jazz music (which ironically has influenced generations of ‘modern’ Western musicians). And “beggars break-dancing in the dust”!? Well that critique just writes itself.

There is much to analyze, comment, marvel, and report about in Africa, but surely we can do this in more creative and less damaging ways. This plea is echoed in Binyavanga Wainaina’s tongue-in-cheek essay How (Not) to Write About Africa, a narrated version of which went viral on YouTube. Is Ethiopia a highly complex and rapidly changing place? Yes. Is it wrought with contradictions and challenges? Yes. Are there less sensational and more nuanced ways of describing this? I think so. And perhaps this is the optimist in me, but I think the world is ready to listen to that story for a change.

 Hassan Hussein Kochore writes about a ‘we shall return home’ narrative gaining traction in parts of northern Kenya. People are looking north to a post-Meles Ethiopia while worrying what the 2013 Kenyan elections will bring.

In his seminal work on nationalism, Imagined Communities (1983), Benedict Anderson suggested that a feeling of national community is produced by the knowledge that all over the nation people are performing the daily ritual of reading the same newspaper.  This idea is best captured in the name of our own Kenyan newspaper, the Daily Nation.  In Nairobi, one can take for granted the ease with which a newspaper can be obtained from the supermarket, roadside vendors, and hawkers in traffic jams or even by borrowing it from a fellow passenger in a matatu. Many matatus these days actually have a copy of the day’s paper and if you’re lucky enough to sit next to the driver, you can monopolize it. By the time you get to your destination, you’ll have read the whole paper for free!

Then picture a place where a newspaper is hard to come by, a place where you can only ever buy yesterday’s paper, asking a shopkeeper on a Monday morning, “Nipatie Sunday Nation ya leo.” (Give me today’s Sunday Nation). Welcome to Marsabit County in northern Kenya, the nation’s ‘B-side’. Northern Kenya has historically been marginalized, closed off from the rest of Kenya and development actors like the churches. It was only after independence that the Catholic Church, for example, was allowed to build schools in Marsabit. Roads are almost non-existent, with heavy trucks – the most popular means of transport – carving out new roads for themselves every few days in the sandy landscape. It still takes two days riding on the roof of a truck to get to Marsabit from Nairobi.

On the way, just after leaving the frontier town of Isiolo, you’ll meet herders walking to distant water points with their cattle, camels, and herds of goats and sheep. The herders occasionally try to stop speeding cars for water, waving their plastic jerry cans in a plea for assistance, or try to catch a lift to the next trading center, which are few and far between. With almost immotorable dusty roads, the journey is far from an enjoyable experience – save for the picturesque savanna landscape and the wildlife occasionally dashing dangerously from the bushes in front of the passing vehicles.  At almost every trading center, a person will ask you “Habariya Kenya?” (‘How’s Kenya?’).  This is the situation that a long history of state neglect has produced: apathetic citizens who do not see themselves as part of Kenya.

Tarmacking of the Marsabit-Moyale road has begun. Photo courtesy of Liz Watson.

In order to turn this history on its head, the government of Kenya has included in its economic blueprint Vision 2030 a major plan to change northern Kenya from a low potential area to a high potential one. In fact, there is a separate Vision 2030 document for ‘Northern Kenya and other arid and semi-arid areas’ underlining the ‘commitment’ of the government to open up the North to economic opportunities. One of the more literal ways they plan open up this area is through the construction of roads. The road from Isiolo to Marsabit is already half tarmacked while work has begun on the Moyale-Marsabit road. Once completed, these will provide a direct, tarmacked connection between Nairobi and Addis Ababa.

The face of northern Kenya therefore is changing, and one might expect people’s opinions and loyalty to the Kenyan state to shift accordingly. However, while the government has set out to socially and economically integrate the northern populations into Kenya, the narratives on the ground seem to be painting a contrasting picture.

For example, in the remote Boran areas of Marsabit county, there are discussions about the prophecies of a famous Boran prophet called Arero Bosaro who, about two centuries ago according to the tale, had prophesied that ‘a black road’ (read tarmac) would come from the direction of what is now ‘Kenya’, carrying all the Boran from the south (Nairobi, Mombasa, etc.) and pour them into their homeland of Dirre and Liban in southern Ethiopia. This is interpreted alongside another prophecy that Kenya will not last more than three abas (presidents). It is said in this prophecy that the South (Kenya) will become dark and the North (Ethiopia) will light up. The demise of Meles Zenawi is given as one of the indicators of a brightening Ethiopia as the Oromo population in Ethiopia (including the Boran) faced marginalization and brutality under the Zenawi regime. His exit gives hope of an Ethiopia in which the majority ethnic community, the Oromo, will thrive (though this of course is debatable). On the other hand, the confusion surrounding the several tiered elections in Kenya (‪voters used to chose only their local councilor, M.P. and then the president, but now have to vote for about 6 positions – president, governor, M.P., senator, county representative, and women’s representative as well as potentially vote in a presidential rerun; see more about confusion surrounding the election here) and the possibility of the next Kenyan president being detained in a ‘foreign court’ (ICC) is seen as portending tough times ahead for Kenya. Worries about these developments underlie a sense of anxiety on the periphery about the forthcoming Kenyan general elections. This anxiety is all the more marked because the elections represent a moment of transition for the country on several fronts, not only because of the Kibaki succession but also because they are supposed to usher in a new federalist governance structure.

The prospects of opportunities in a post-Meles Ethiopia and the ‘return home’ narrative told through the prophecies seems to be gaining traction, especially among the elderly and the young rural folk who are marginalised and lack opportunities, and to whom their homeland of Dirre and Liban has powerful symbolism.  This narrative is obviously counterproductive for the Kenyan state’s ‘nationalist project’ of opening up the North to Kenya. People’s hearts still seem to lie elsewhere. With names such as Dirre Dawa, Soyama, Tulla Sallan and Nagelle (all places in southern Ethiopia) on trucks and shops across Marsabit County, it is not hard to see that northerners perceive themselves as belonging to a different ‘imagined community’.

Indeed, gubernatorial politics in Marsabit has already spilled over into Ethiopia. A few months ago, the Boran Abagada (Boran political leader) based in southern Ethiopia endorsed one Boran candidate for the position of the governor of Marsabit. Only time will tell whether his decision will be backed by the Boran electorate, but one thing is clear: Ethiopia has become important in the political life of the area more than ever before. WIth the impending opening up of northern Kenya to southern Ethiopia through the construction of the Isiolo-Moyale road, it seems likely that this connection will be reinforced.

A tarmacked section of the Isiolo-Marsabit road. Photo courtesy of Liz Watson.

Hassan Kochore is a research assistant at the National Museums of Kenya. Recent research in Marsabit, together with Dr. Elizabeth Watson,  was funded by the Royal Geographical Society in conjunction with the Thesiger Oman International Fellowship. The views expressed here are entirely his own and do not, in any way, represent those of NMK or the Royal Geographical Society.

On October 11^th, the Rift Valley held its first ‘Nairobi Forum’. They invited Ken Menkhaus, Amal Ismail, Jabril Abdulla and Matt Bryden to discuss the post-election climate in Somalia. The former Kenyan ambassador to Somalia, Mohamed Abdi Affey, who was chairing the proceedings, joked: “We wanted to show Kenya what it means to be a democratic nation”.

All parties agreed that Hassan Sheikh Mohamud is a man who combines two clean hands with enormous street cred. There is reason for ‘cautious optimism’ even amidst the challenges ahead. Ken Menkhaus argued that it was not the election of this single remarkable man that was important, but the extensive support network behind him. Describing this network as a ‘constructive elite,’ Menkhaus clarified that this was not a mass uprising ‘Somali Spring’ but a civic mobilization of determined professionals tired of warlordism and ineffective foreign interventions alike. These individuals have been on the ground for the past 20 years, building hospitals, schools, universities and private businesses. They have spent the past 20 years “navigating the streets” as Ken Menkhaus put it. They have learnt how to negotiate deals with difficult parties, how to build trust across clans and most importantly, they know how to get things done. Jabril Abdulla added that these negotiating skills are important. The gradual expansion of the state will not just involve institutions, but people, some benign and some less palatable. Getting warlords to engage in politics is one of the key challenges.

Abdulla added that while elites had gotten him elected, there was nonetheless widespread public support behind his victory. He described how the public ‘legitimized’ the election by broadcasting the news on radios and televisions during the week following the election. However he also cautioned that there were some regions that did not share in the jubilation.

Nevertheless, as each of them said in turn, there is reason for cautious optimism.

All presenters highlighted the challenges ahead:

1)      The power struggles over the composition of the new state; with each appointment comes a new battle (Menkhaus)

2)      Deep/harsh debates over the nature of federalism, especially in the Southern areas that are more mixed (Menkhaus and Bryden)

3)      In the liberated spaces, what power will take control? The government, local communities or African Union troops? (Menkhaus)

4)      Looming land disputes with the potential for significant foreign investments (Menkhaus)

5)      Piracy has moved on land and this will complicate things for the new government (Menkhaus)

6)      Getting the task at hand done is a formidable challenge with little money and few working institutions at hand (Abdulla).

7)      The harsh unforgiving political climate: The public has enormous expectations and usually gives leaders 60 days before assigning nicknames if they don’t deliver. They have to make immediate noticeable impact in order to placate the name-givers (Abdulla).

8)      The new government is young and fairly inexperienced. 55% of the parliament is new, 40% are from the diaspora and 56% hold college degrees. The average age is 45-50.

9)      The challenge to dismantle the system of fadl , the paying of favours to civil servants (Abdulla).

The underlying challenge of the government is to change the nature of the political game from violence to political discourse.

Perhaps the most important sense that I took from the event was the strong Somali ownership that hangs over the election. All participants stressed that this is a job for Somalis; international actors would do well to take a few steps back and make space for new Somali politicians to do their thing (this was significant because the majority of the audience was composed of international aid workers and security experts). The presenters also cautioned them not to introduce foreign aid into politics, to be aware of how money for counter-terrorism and security can feed into political violence and that even ordinary meetings with foreign agencies take time that these busy politicians do not have. Amal Islamil stressed that the new government should include women and youth, who have suffered most under state collapse.

At the same time, both Abdulla and Bryden talked about how progress has already been made. The government has drafted a common document and a national budget. The budget is particularly significant as it allows for the procurement of institutional revenue, separate from the system of fadl. These are significant steps and so again, we must say, cautious optimism! Inshallah!

 You can download the podcast of the event here or stream it from RVI’s website here.

This is reblogged from Laura’s own blog: http://lauraelizabethmann.com/blog/. Laura is a postdoctoral researcher in the Internet Institute at the University of Oxford. She has conducted research in Egypt, Sudan, Kenya and Rwanda.

They have just published the first edition of their newsletter, which you can check out here.

The Voice of Students Newsletter

Read to find out about a range of issues – from water management and agriculture to financial institutions in Somaliland. The newsletter also showcases SDA’s efforts to build a public library in Hargeisa. If you’re headed that way, take a few books of your own to add to their collection!

You can also follow SDA on facebook.

Samson A. Bezabeh recently completed his PhD at the Department of Social Anthropology, University of Bergen. His article ‘Citizenship and the Logic of Sovereignty in Djibouti’ won the 2012 African Author Prize from the journal African Affairs.

Beyond the fiction of reality, there is the reality of the fiction. Slavoy Zizek, ‘Less Than Nothing’

In his latest comedic movie, Sacha Baron Cohen plays the dictator of a fictional country, Wadiya, the location of which is clearly present-day Eritrea. In the plot, the dictator of Wadiya, President Prime Minister Admiral General Haffaz Aladeen, goes to the United Nations headquarters in New York to discuss sanctions against his country’s nuclear programme, but ends up falling in love with Zoey, the feminist caterer working at the conference. To impress her, Aladeen deviates from his original script and declares that Wadiya will have a true democracy. A year later, he conducts a ‘democratic election’, which is actually far from being fair and free. Aladeen is declared the winner with 98.8 percent of the vote, after compelling everyone to vote for him. In short, Aladeen the dictator continues to deceive Zoey and the world. He also continues to enrich uranium.

Ismail Omar Guelleh, President of Djibouti, in 2006. Picture credits: saraab, http://www.flickr.com/photos/saraab/314596280/

When real life politics seem risible, perhaps we need to draw attention to the humor of politics and the politics of humor. Indeed, the case of the Republic of Djibouti, which adjoins the fictitious Republic of Wadiya, may require this kind of approach. The Republic of Djibouti has existed as an independent nation state since 1977, following an independence vote that brought to an end French colonial rule in this strategically important region. Since independence, the country’s political system has been dominated by a single political party, the Rassemblement Populaire pour le Progrès (RPP). Members of a single family – the Guelleh family – have been the only leaders of the country under the banner of the RPP.

This week, however, the RPP has shown signs of a willingness to change. On the party’s web page, as well as on television, radio and in the newspaper of Djibouti, which is controlled by the RPP, we were told that they remarkable modifications have been made to the party structure. This much-talked about structural change consists among other things of the replacement of the party’s old guard with newcomers, in a move seen as an attempt to revitalize the group that has held power since independence. This reform follows a report written by a committee established to evaluate the party’s present condition.

The committee’s findings, which have been informally circulating among Djiboutian politicians, and which have also been published by Djibouti’s Human Rights League, note that the party lost two major districts in the last elections, and that this instigated debate among the party’s central committee members. For this reason, the report states, the committee has been mandated to make an evaluation of the party’s president and the country’s present leader, Ismail Omar Guelleh. As part of its evaluation, which is based on a number of interviews, the committee identified a series of problems within the party, ranging from the deteriorating condition of party-owned premises to problems of organizing party members, and the ineffectiveness of the party school.

As part of its proposed solution, the report recommends bolstering the party’s financial capacity by mobilizing supplementary resources and by canceling payments for locations (party offices) that have been out of use for years but which the party has been unwittingly paying for. Noting the importance of maintaining a positive image, the committee also recommends renovating and updating the offices that are retained. In relation to communications, the committee further recommends reinforcing the capacity of the party newspaper, le Progrès, as well as taking disciplinary action against those party members who leak information.

In its recommendations, the committee, and subsequently the party, falls short of addressing the party’s problems as they are seen from outside, however. Here, the party’s problems, including the fact that it lost two major districts, are regarded as internal and as having to do with financial capacity, visibility, and so on. The RPP is prepared to further reinforce its capacity and visibility rather than preparing itself for the opening of political space in Djibouti. The much-discussed reforms are not seen as honest reform and a sign of readiness to change, but as a semblance of reform that has instigated an internal reshuffle without questioning the status quo of the Guelleh family and the RPP in Djibouti. In fact, the reporting of the reforms in Djibouti’s government-owned newspaper clearly demonstrates the unchanging nature of national politics in this region. In the government-controlled media there is constant emphasis on the idea that reform has occurred not haphazardly but through the patronage and direction of Ismail Omar Guelleh.

In view of this, what the reshuffling and restructuring leaves us with is a state of affairs that falls within the realm of the kind of comedy outlined at the start of this article. Lacking any serious intent to resolve the problematic affairs of Djibouti, the political situation here seems akin to a live replay of Cohen’s satire, in which the protagonist has put on a show of reform only to enforce old tactics through new measures.

The current party strategy will place Djibouti in line with Russian or Chinese-style democracies, which have been increasingly copied throughout the region, and indeed across the continent as a whole. The Chinese Communist Party, for example, has declared a leadership transition that has been widely anticipated by the international community. As in the case of Djibouti, however, the Chinese are not interested in changing the status quo but in reshuffling party members and bringing new faces to the fore.

At present, what is expected from the Djibouti population is that they should live in just such a Chinese- or Russian-style democracy, which seems reminiscent of Cohen’s state of Wadiya. What this suggests is the continuing significance of old actors across this continent. Indeed, it should not be forgotten that before the present Chinese economic involvement in Africa, Chinese ideologies (as well as Russian ones) had widespread influence. What these political strategies in Djibouti and some other African countries show is that the adaptation of strategies from cold-war actors whose significance has declined or changed is not necessarily a recipe for success; for a country as small as Djibouti, adopting a strategy of reform that entails no actual reform will not be easy, especially when the Horn of Africa and surrounding regions have been engulfed in political reform. In Djibouti, the death of Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Melese Zenawi, for example, has been a closely watched event. In fact, the state funeral held in Addis Ababa was transmitted live on Radio Télévision Djibouti (RTD), despite the fact that the events were taking place in another country.

This increased focus on Ethiopia’s affairs is not without reason; it is happening because a possible destabilization of Ethiopia, or a change in the politics of Addis Ababa, will have implications for Djibouti, especially in its northern Afar-dominated region. Here, there is resentment towards the Issa, who dominate Djibouti politics. Already there are signs of agitation in Djibouti that surface from time to time: one example is provided by the recent strikes by workers at Doraleh Port; another is the resentment expressed among the Afar community against the implementation of the Tadjourah deep sea port project, funded by the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (AFESD), which includes a plan to construct a railway line linking the port with the state of Tigray in Ethiopia. Given the shifting Horn of Africa environment, engaging in a reform process that is not meant to produce real change will not provide a solution to a rapidly worsening situation – which is a result of the stifling political environment here, rather than RPP’s lack of financial capacity or deterioration of its office stock. The country’s President Prime Minister Admiral General Haffaz Aladeen and his associates should be able to come up with a better plan to meet people’s needs in this country – one which might provide the basis for real democracy.